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In the Supreme Court of the Stale of Utah 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs.-
VEI{L FARNSWORTH, 
Defendant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
45221 
The defendant, Verl Farnsworth, was convicted of 
~Peond degree murder by a jury in a trial before the 
Honorable Bryant H. Croft, .Ju<lg<>. 
DISPOSITION OF rrHE CASF~ 
BY LO\VER COURT 
The defendant was sentenced to the indeterminate 
tenn as provided by law for the crime of second degree 
li\lll'Qf'l'. 
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2 
RELIEF SOUGHrr OX APPEAL 
The defendant requests the court to reverse the d<'<'i-
sion of the lower court and to set asidt~ the convietion 
of murder in the second d('gre('. In the alternative, the> 
appellant se<:>ks a new trial based upon the enors C'o11i-
mittt>d by the trial eonrt. 
Srl'A'11 E~11,_:Nrl' OF FACTS 
On May 27, 1967 Verl Farnsworth, the defendant 
shot and killed James Roger Farnsworth, his son, at tlie 
residence located at 1215 Stewart Strf'et, Salt Lake City, 
l~tah. 
On May 27, 1967 Ralph \V. Whittaker, Salt Lak(• 
City Police Department was hailed down by n<>ighhor, 
l\frs. "Wilson, to invPstigate the shooting that ocenrrPd just 
minutes before ( rnt 89)' He walk Pel into thP resiclP!lC'(' 
at 1215 St('wart Stret>t, Salt Lah City lTtah, and ohst>n't•d 
the son on tlw living room floor and dPfrndant sitting in 
a chair (TH-. 92). He also ohserwd tlw wifo of th<• cl<'-
fendant and mother of the victim in the living room. 
Thereupon he took possession of a 22 cloublP adion hand 
gnn that was near the ddendant. l It> took the ddernlmit 
out to the patrol car, plaePd him mH.1<•r anest aml plac('<l 
handcuffs on him ('1'H, 7-1-). }Ip ohse1·v<0 d that tlwre w«n· 
two shots spent in the \\'(•:1pon. 'l'hen•art«r, lw rpcPiw<l 
anotlwr \\'<•apon from m10tlwr 11w1111wr of tlw Salt Lnk1• 
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3 
City Police Dc>partment which was a 22 caliber hand gun 
single action made in -west Germany. He observed that 
tlie gun was uncocked and one round had been expended 
('rR 9G-~>7). At tlw time of the officer's entrance the de-
frnclant made the statement that he had shot the boy, 
tliat he was not sorry and hoped that he did not die for 
his "TifP's sake (TR. 98). 
Zelda ·Wilson, a neighbor living across the street 
and three houses down from the scene of the accident, 
testified as to hearing loud arguing and voices. She 
specifically indicated that she heard the defendant say 
"l'll kill you" (TR. 134). After these words were uttered 
she ohserved tlw defendant come outside the residence 
obtained a weapon from his car parked in the driveway 
and the dPfendant fired one shot in the air (TR. 134). 
Prior to observing this incident, she had observed the 
<lei'Pndant at a local grocery store and indicated that she 
<letected a strong ordor of alcohol and that it was her 
opinion that the defendant was under the influence of 
alcohol wlwn lw was ohserved at the store (TR 144 ). 
Hobert Stewart, pathologist, testified that he con-
dncte<l a post-mortem examination on May 27, 1967 at 
~t. Mark's Hospital ('I1R. 8-1-). A slug was removed from 
tl1P vidim and tlw <l<>ath was irnmediately due to damage 
t n the heart and lungs en ns<>d hy tlw hull Pt (TR. 88). 
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6 
station attendants he took it to \YOrk (TR 180). Defend-
ant further testified that he knew that the victim kept 
his gun in the house, however, he was not sure where the 
weapon ·was kept. He further \Vas aware that the victim's 
weapon was a single action hand weapon and that in 
order to fire the same one must cock the hairm1er before 
you can pull the trigger (TR. UH). At the time that thP 
shooting occurred he testi.t1Pd that he didn't havr~ time to 
observe the position of the hammer of the victim's gun. 
He further was aware that the victim's gun was loaded 
('TR. 188). Defendant testified that he did not intend 
to kill his son and that the only reason he shot the Hon 
was because he felt that his son was going to shoot him 
(TR. 182). Moreover, at the time the defendant got the 
weapon he intendr~d only to scare his son. 
On cross-examination the defendant's story was es-
~entially the same. The prosecution pointed out srveral 
inconsistent statements made by the defendant to the offi-
cers who immediately arrived at the scene and who trans-
ported the defendant en route to the hospital (TR. 182). 
The prosecution cross-examined the defendant as to prior 
threats to other people with his weapon (TR. 183). '!.'he 
court over ruled the defendant's objection thereto a' 
heing prejudicial and irrelPvant. On rebuttal tlic' pro-
secution called Slterrv Farnsworth, daughter of defend-
ant, who testified that tlw son got the weapon after shr 
heard the shot fired by the defendant oufaicle thr resi-
clr>nce crR. 227). 
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Aft<>r the defendant was arrested at the scene, he was 
transported to the Salt Lake City Police Department 
by Officer -Whittaker. En route Officer 'Whittaker stop-
ped the vehicle to advise the defendant of his rights 
under l\Iiranda, using the Miranda card (TR 191). The 
clPfendant began to speak about the circumstances of the 
incident and the officer asked the defendant that if by 
talking lw was waiving his rights to an attorney, where-
upon the defendant stated "I guess I ought to talk to a 
];rnr>·er hdore I make a formal statement, but I'll tell you 
what happen Pd." Nothing further was said regarding 
the request for counsel. After the defendant had arrived 
~t the jail he was again interrogated by Officer Leonard 
J~lton, Salt Lake City Police Department, who obtained 
a tape recording from the defendant. The defendant 
moved the trial court to have a hearing outside the 
presence of tlH~ jury to determine the constitutionality of 
the statement given by the defendant in order that the 
prosPcntion could use the same for rebuttal. (TR. 188). 
DPfernlant ·was called in connection with the defense 
counsel's rPquest to exclude the statement and the de-
fl'ndant tPstified in suhstancP that he advised the offi-
<·<·r~ that he guessed lw ought to have an attorney but that 
11<' would giv0 the officer a stafrment (TR 197). De-
frndant further testified that he did not know the dif-
f<T<>nee lwtwePn a formal or informal statement (TR. 
I ~IS). ?II oreowr, defendant testified that prior to the 
ti111<· tl1t> tape was taken he advised the officers that he 
did not havf' an attornev and the officer replied, "Well, 
m·'ll appoint yon an attorn<>y so wt>'ll have an attorney 
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there." (TR. 199). Moreover, the defendant testiforJ 
that he did not intend to waive his right to have an at. 
torney present and although he understood they were 
taking his statement, he did not understand the fnnda. 
mental part of waiving his right (TR 199). 
On cross examination dt•f endant testified in responsp 
to the prosecutor's question that he did not ask for one 
"attorney" at that time (TR 200). The tape of the dP-
fendant was f'ntered without objection by defense at thi, 
time for the purpose of the motion to suppress (TR 
202). The trial court ruled that the admissions by tlw 
defendant are admissible for impeachment purpo~e' 
(TR. 206). 
Thereafter Officer l~lton was n'called as a rebuttal 
witness and testified as to certain statements made to 
him during the tinw of intf'rrogation (TR. 121-1'.23). 
The defendant was convicted by a jury of second 
degree murder and sentenced to tht> Ftah State Prison 
for an indeterminate te11n. Othe>r pertinent facts will lw 
brought out during the argument. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE 
DEFENDANT'S STATEMEN'TS WERE ADMISSIBLE AFTER 
DEFENDANT HAD INDICATED A DESIRE TO TALK TO 
AN ATTORNEY. 
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The appellant took the witness stand in his own 
behalf. After the appellant rested the prosecution, over 
appellant's objection as to the admissibility of said state-
ments, used the appellant's prior oral statements to im-
peach the appellant's testimony. The def en<lant contends 
that the trial court erred permitting the prosecution to 
use the defendant's prior statements for impeachment. 
A hearing was held outside the presence of the jury 
regarding the admissibility of the defendant's prior 
statenwnts (11 R 191). Officer Whittaker testified that 
lw arTc>sted thf' defendant and \\'hile c>n route to the 
police station advised the defendant of his rights by 
reading th<~ Miranda card (TR. 192). After the de-
fendant was advised, the officer testified as follows: 
"A. Oh, he started to talk about the circumstances 
of the incident again and I asked him if in so 
doing he was waiving his rights to an attorney 
and he said, 'I guess I ought to talk to a 
lawyer before I make a formal statement, but 
I'll tetl you what happened.' " 
Thertiafh•r, at tlw polict> station, a tape was made (TR 
l!l8). 
Tlw <lPf endant was called in his own behalf at the 
lH·aring- to suppress the statement. He testified that he 
was unawarP of thf' diffrrence bf'tween a formal or in-
formal statenwnt (TR 198). FurthPr, he told tlw office 
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"that I guess l ought to have an attonwy, but I would 
give him a statement" (TR 197). Furth<>r, the defendant 
didn't understand the fundamental part of waiving his 
rights (TR 199). 
Fnder the rulf' in Miranda r. Arizona, 38.t 11.S . .t3G, lG 
L ed. 2d G94, 89 S. Ct. 1602, tlw iiros<~cution may not llSP 
statf'ments, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stem-
ming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unles, 
it demonstrates thl• use of procedural safeguards effec-
tive to SPCUn' tlw privilege against self-incrimination. 
"B~r custodial interrogation, we mean que~­
tioning initiated by la\\' enforcenwnt officers after 
a person has bePn taken into custody ... As for ' 
the procedural safeguards to ht> ernploy<>d, ... thP 
following rneasures are rt>qnired. Prior to any 
<gwstions, the iwrson must hP warnPd that ht• lias 
a right to remain silent, that any state11wnt he 
doPs make may be used as (_•vidern·e against hirn, 
and that hP has a right to the presence of an 
attorney, eitlwr retained or appointed." 384 u.S. 
at 44.t, 1 ()Led 2d at 706. 
Once these warnings have been givlm, the d<'fend-
ant's response deterrnim•s the stl~ps the police can there-
after pursue. Ordinarily tlw defendant will either re-
q nest counst>l, or lw will \\'aive tllP right of counsel, or lie 
will makP sollH' stat<>nwnt which is neithPr a request for 
nor a waiv<>r of colmsf·l. 
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If the defendant specifically requests counsel, this 
response affirmatively guarantees defendant's right to 
counsel before any any questioning can take place. Any 
answers by the defendant to the questions put by police 
are not adamissible because they violate his right of 
eounsel (Gth Amendment). 
"An individual need not make a pre-interro-
gation request for a lawyer. . . . [But] such 
[a] request affirmatively secures his right to have 
one ... " 38G U.S. at 470, 16 L. ed. 2d a 720. 
'' ... If the individual states that he wants 
an attorney, the interrogation must cease until 
the attornPy is present." 386 U.S. at 474, 16 L ed 
~d at 72:-:l. 
". . . if he indicates in any manner and at any 
stage of he process that he wishes to consult with 
an attorney before speaking there can be no ques-
tioning." 384- U.S. at 444-16 Led 2d at 70G. 
If the defendant exprf'ssly waives or if he neither 
n·qu<>sts nor waives his right to counsel, questions may 
he askPd of the defendant. Ho\\'ever, in court, there is 
no presumption of waiver. Instead there is a heavy 
hurdrn on the prosecution to demonstrate ( 1) that the 
(lPf('ndant >rniv<>d his rights and (2) that the defendant 
knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against 
~P]f inerimination. If that heavy burden is met, the 
prospcntion can us<' answers made by the defendant in 
intPrrogation. In each case (of \\'aiver or of neither waiver 
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nor request), the admissibility of the fruits of the int(·r-
rogation is dependent upon tlw prosecution's meeting of 
its heavy burden to demonstrate tlw eiJectin•nrss of 
the wain•r. 
''The defendant rna ,. waive effectuation of 
these rights }JI'ovid0.J th~.. \\·aiver is made volun-
tarily, knowinITT·, and i11tt>lligently.~' 38-1 r.s. at 
-!-+-!, 16 L t>d :2cl at 70(). 
"Presuming \Yaiver from a silent rt>cord is 
impermissible. The rc-'cord must sho\\·, or tlwrv 
must be an allegation and t>Yidence ,,-hich shml', 
that an accused \\·as offered counsel hnt intelli-
gently and understandingly rt>jt>ctPd tlw offrr. 
Anything 11-'ss is not a wain•r." 
.. If the interrogation c·ontinues without the 
presPnce of an attorney and a statement is takrn, 
a heavy burden n_.sts on tlw g·ovt-rnment to demon-
strate that the dt>f endant kno\\·ingly and intelli-
gentl:· waived his privil<'ge against sPlf incrimi-
nation and his right to rf'tained or appointPll 
('Ol1nS('l. ... " :~8+ r.s. at -t7;) 1 () L Pd :2d 72..J.. 
In Miranda there is sornt> language coneerning what 
could constitute waive>r hut there is also somP language 
about what 1cill 11ot constitute waiver. 
"An express statement that tlw incliYidnal 
is willing to make a statenwnt and does not want 
an attorney could constitnt<' a wain·r, but a yalid 
waiver wiiI not lw prPsmnPd simply from tlH' 
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sile~ce of the accused after warnings are given 
or snnply from the fact that confession was in fact 
eventually obtained ... " 284 L.S. at 475, 16 L ed 
2d at 724. 
"The mere fact that he mav have answered 
some questions or volunteered ·some statements 
on his own does not deprive him of the right to 
refrain from answering any further inquiries 
until he has consulted \vith an attorney and there-
after consents to be questioned." 384 r.s. -145, lG 
Led 2d at 707. 
" ... [H]is failure to ask for a lawyer does 
not ~onstitute a waiver." 384 U.S. at 470, 16 L ed 
2d at 72. 
"If the defendant makes any volunteered 
statements, i.e., statements made not in response to 
any question put to the defendant by the police, 
these statements are admissible in evidence be-
cause they do not infringe on the defendant's 
rights against self incrimination." 
"The fundamental import of the privilege 
while an individual is in custody is not whether 
he is allowed to talk to the police without the 
benefits of warnings and counsel, but whether he 
can be interrogated ... Volunteer statements of 
anv kind are not barred bv the Fifth Amendment 
and their admissibility is ~ot affected by our hold-
ing today." 384 F.D. at -173 1 G L ed 2d at 726. 
"To summarize ... the following measures 
are requirt>d: He must be warned prior to any 
questions required that he has the right to the 
presencP of an attorney. Opportunity to exercise 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
[ thi~ right] n~ust be afforded to him throughout 
the mterrogation. After such warnings have bPen 
given, and such opportunity afforded him, the 
individual may knowingly and intelligently waiVP 
[this right] and agree to answer questions or make 
a statement. But unless such warnings and waiver 
are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no 
evidence obtained as a result of interogation can 
be used against him." 384 P.S. at "178, -±79; 1G L 
ed 2d at 726. 
In the prc>sen t case, the ~liranda ·warnings were 
given the defendant almost irmnediah'ly upon arTPst. 
The defendant's response to these warnings, as testified 
to by the the arresting officer was, "I guess I ought to 
talk to a lawyer before I make a formal statement, hut 
I'll tell you what happened." (TR 193). This rPsponsP 
fits in the category of request for counsel or at least 
that of a non-r<>quest or non-waivPr of eonns<~l. 
It is possibly a request for coun:-:c>l lwcause inMirandn 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that: 
" ... [i]f [a suspect) indicates in any man-
ner and at any stag<~ of the process that he wishes 
to consult with an attorney before speaking ther<' 
can he no questioning." 38-1- F.S. at -1--14-A-1-5. 
l f 1, · (' 1T c' ·J2 L ed In t 1e ease o 'razter L . upp, ...... ...., ....... , ~ 
2d 684, the d<'frndant was charged with homicide. After 
he was given a somewhat abbreviated description of his 
. constitutional rights, he was questioned. The clefondant 
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was reluctant to talk and after starting to tell his story, 
"he again showed signs of reluctance and said, 'I think 
I better get a lawyer before I talk anymore. I am going 
to get into trouble more than I am now.' " 22 L ed 2d 68. 
The Court affirmed the conviction because the case was 
post-Escobedo but pre-1\Iiranda and said Miranda in that 
instance was to be applied at the discretion of the State 
Supreme Courts. As dicta however, th<" court said: 
"Pf'titioner argues that his statement about 
getting a lawyer \\'as sufficient to bring Escobedo 
have stovped the questioning and obtained counsel 
into play and that the police should immediately 
for him. We might agree "'ere Miranda applicable 
in this case [for the reasons set forth in the 
Miranda quotation above] ... " Frazier v. Cupp, 
______ F.S. at ______ , 22 Led 2d at 68 ____ . 
If, however, the statement by the defendant is not a 
rrquest for C'ounsel, it is necessarily (1) an express 
waiver, or (2) a statf'mPnt which is neither a specific 
request nor an express waivPr. Defendant's contention 
is that it was at least a non-request non-waiver statement 
bPcausP the defendant did not expressly state that he 
did not want an attorney. In fact there is testimony 
that the defendant had wanted an attorney present dur-
ing tlw tape reeording (T. 199-200). 
In any cast>, tivPn if the right to counsel is expressly 
\\'a ive<l : 
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" [ i Jf th0 inkrrogation continues without thr 
presfmce of an attorney and a statenwnt is taken, 
a heavy burdPn rt-sts on the g·overnment to demon-
strate that tlw defendant knowingly and intelli-
gently waived his ... right to ... eounsel." Mi-
randa, 3S4 F.S. at 475, Hi Led at 724. 
The prosecution in this case did not nwet its burden. 
The evidence supporting this burclPn simply goes to the 
question of whether or not th" dt-f endant spPcifically 
requE'stE'd connsP 1. 
In the case of Swenson v. Bosler, 38G U.S. 258 at 260, 
18 L et 2d 33 at 36, 87 S. Ct. 996 (1967) the Court said 
that "it is now settlE'd 'that where thE' assistance of coun-
sel is a constitutional requisite, thP right to be furnishrd 
counsel does not depend on a rt>quest." (citing) Comley 
'V. Cochran, 3G9 U.S. 50(), 8 L Pd :2cl 70, IG, 82 S. Ct. SS-t." 
A case sp0-cifically in point is Sullins v. U.S., 38!) K 
2d 985 (CA 10 1965) where four persons were arrPstrd 
and then given the Miranda warnings. The defendants 
contended that they had specifically asked for counsel. 
The testifying policP officers dPni(•d that they had n·-
quested counsf•l at any time hut thP officers did testify 
that at no timP had any one of the defendants expr<>ssly 
said that he did not want to comnlt a lawyer heforc ques-
tioning. Tht> con rt said: 
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"The testimony of the officers that none of 
the accused specifically declined consultation with 
a lawyer before answering questions is fatal to 
the admissibility of their inculpatory statements, 
for the Court said in Miranda v. United States, 
that not only doc~s 'a lwavy burden' rest upon the 
Government to show a waiver of the constitutional 
privilege against self-incrimination and the right 
to retained or appointed counsel but also that 
iuaiver is never to be presumed from failure to ask 
for counsel." 389 F.2d at p. 988. 
The next question to be discussed is whether state-
nwnts made by the dpfendant can be used to impeach 
his own tt>stimony. Tlw majority of jurisdictions and the 
h(•ttrr n;asoned law prohibits such use. In People v. 
l.'nderzrnod (Cal 19G-1) 389 P.2d 937, the defendant was 
charged with and convicted of rape, robbery and kidnap-
ping. '11 he prosecution attempted to impeach defendant's 
testimony hy using admissions that he had made to the 
poliC'P during admittedly irnpropt>r interrogation. The 
court said: 
'' [i]t is ... established in California and many 
otlwr jurisdictions that involuntary confessions 
may not he used for purposes of impeaching the 
tPstimony of an accused. (Cast's cited.) ·we be-
liew a similar rult> should operate to exclude in-
voluntary admissions wlwn they are offered for 
that purj)()se, and it has been so held in a number 
of jurisdictions. (People v. Hiller, 2 Ill. 2d 323, 
118 N.E. 2d 11, 13; Stalf v. Palmer, 232 La. 468, 
!)-J. So. 2d -J.39, 444--J.45, State v. Burnett, 357 Mo. 
]()(), 20(i S."\Y. 2<l 8-J.fi, 8-J.7-848; St't' 89 AL R 2d 4 78, 
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479.). ·. : . [\V]e should not permit an accused's 
cred1b1hty to be attacked by the use of an involun-
tary statement which would be inadmissible as 
affirmative evidence .... '' 389 P.2d at p. 941. 
In Johnson v. G.S., 3-14 F.2<l u;:1 (CADC 1%4) thL· 
defendant was not represented by counsel at the time 
of his interrogation which produced a confrssion. A:,; 
the court Raid, 
"in general, evidence which is inadmissible to 
prow~ the case in chief is inadmissible for all 
purposes unless the defendant himself introdur(~s 
the evidence or is in some manner estopped from 
objecting to its use. The evidence is not rendered 
admissible merely because the defrndant testifies 
in his own he half." at Hi4, 1 ()5. 
The basis for this rule is strongly stated in Harrold 
v. Territory of Okl.ahonw, 1 G9 F. 47, 50 (8th Cireuit, 190H) 
"The privilege granted to an aecused pen;on 
of testifying on his own behalf would be a poor end 
and useless one indePd if lw could (~xercise it only 
on condition that Pvery incompetent confession 
[or statement] induced by tlw promises, or wrung-
from him bv the unl"wafnl secret inquisitions and 
criminating. suggestions, of arresting or holding-
offic0rs, :::;hould lwcornt> <>YidPnCP aairn;t him." 
'fhe result should lw tlw sallH' \dwnPY('r th<> con f L'ssion 
or statement is obtained in violation of tlw defendant':< 
right to rounseL 
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As specifically stated in Miranda, 384 U.S. at 44, l(i 
J; cd 2d at 706, 
"The prosecution may not use statements ... 
sterruning from custodial interrogation of the de-
fendant unless it demonstrates the use of proced-
ural safeguards affective to secure the privilege 
against self-icrimination." 
rrhen--fore, the court erred in allowing the pros~u­
tion to use statements made by the defendant which were 
obtained by violating his right to counsel before question-
ing to impeach the defendant's testimony because de-
fendant affirmatively requested counsel, or the prose-
<'ntion failed to meet its heavy burden to demonstrate that 
the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his 
right to counsel. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION ON INVOLUNTARY MAN-
SLAUGHTER WHERE THE FACTS JUSTIFY THE SAME. 
r111w defrndant requested an instruction on involun-
tar.\T marn;laughter. This instruction was submitted on 
tl10 tlwory that the jury could find, under the facts, that 
the dPfendant committed an unlawful act not amounting 
lo a f(·lony. rrhe defendant claimed self defense and un-
dl'l' this claim, the acts of the defendant would not 
nrnount to a fp]ony. 
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This court very recently announcPd in State v. Gil-
lian, filed January 8, 1970, statPd: 
"One of the foundational principles in n~gard 
to the submission of issues to juries is that wlwn· 
the parties so request they are entitled to haw 
instructions given upon t Lt'ir thory of the case; and 
this includes on lPsser offrnses if anv reasonahlt' 
view of the t>vidence would support s~ch a wrdid. 
rrhis is in aC"cord with authorities generall~',3 and 
with the adjudications of this court, as stated 
in a number of cases dealing with instructing on 
lesser offenses: In the cmw of StatP v .• Johnson' 
it is said: 
'That the deft'ndant is t'ntitlPd to haw 
the jury instructed on his theory of the casf' 
if tht're is any substantial 0vide>nce to justify 
hriving sneh an instruction. 
Of similar import is Stat<' v. N<>~wton :"" 
''If tlw jury acct>ptt>d lwr Vt'rsion of the occur-
rence, that it was in such a statP of p111otional up-
set that she got the pistol and firPd it into the room 
several times intl~nding only to scare :Miller, her 
offense could he found to he involuntary man-
slauO'hter in that it \Vas a killing which resulted 
0 
'in the commission of an unlawful act not amount-
in O' to a fplonv' · 01· upon a different view of the 
h • ' 
facts eonl<l he found to he volnntar~, rnanslangfrr 
as a killing· 'upon a sudden quarrPl or in thP lw~:t 
of passion," and tlw fact that anotlw1· 111an ac.e1-
dentallY ht>('UlIH' tht> vidi111 would not necessarily 
make tl1e cri11w mw of a high<'r d0gTPP. \"Vithont 
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fur_ther extenuation, it is also true that if the jury 
heheved that there was an intent to kill, it may 
not have believed beyond a reasonable doubt some 
other element required to make the crime murder 
in the first degree, in which event it would be 
murder in the second degree. 9 " 
Thus, under the most recent pronouncement of this 
court, the trial court should, under law, have granted 
the defendant's requested instruction on involuntary 
manslaughter. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE 
PROSECUTION, OVER THE DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION 
TO CROSS EXAMINE THE DEFENDANT'S PRIOR ACTS 
OF VIOLENCE INVOLVING PERSONS OTHER THAN THE 
VICTIM. 
On cross examination of the defendant, the prose-
eution, over thP Defendant's objection illicited testimony 
that the defendant had threatened to shoot the dog and 
eat (TR 184) and had threatened to kill other members 
of the family (TR 185). 1\f oreover, the prosecution was 
]H'rmitted to ask questions regrading threats made by 
ih0 defondant some two years ago (TR 185). 
As rebuttal, Sherry Farnsworth was called and testi-
fiPd as to the in('ident wherein the defendant said he ;vas 
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gomg to take care of tlwm (cat) and he was going to 
shoot them ( 11H 225). No objection was made hy defense 
counsel. 
The defendant contends that procPdure usf'd lw the 
prosecution was highly in·ejudicial and inflammatory. 
The incident regarding the thn·ats of the defendant dir-
eeted to the dog and cat can only lw construed as pointing 
out to the jury that the defrndant is not a lover of ani-
mals and tlwn•fon~ must be a had person. It elearly 
does not go to the state of mind of tlw defendant with 
regard to the victim. This tPstirnony was further irn-
bedded in the jury's mind when the prosecution wm; 1wr-
mittt>d to bring up the incident by the usf' of a rt>hnttal 
witrn•ss, Slwrry Farnsworth. 
Evidence is not admissihle if its d'foct is nwrely to 
disgrace the defendant or slww his propensity to C'Olll-
mit crime. State v. Dickerson, L2 1 Ttah 2d 8, i3Gl P. 2d 
412 (1961) This case was cit<>d with approval in Stall' 
·v. ChT/ia.11, fi!Pcl 8 Jan nary 1970. 
The defendant submits that the tPstimony regarding 
the threats to dogs and cats was prejudicial. It cannot lw 
stated ·with an.v assurance that then• would not haw lJPrn 
a different n•sult in thP absern·(• of th<> enor in cross l~X­
amining tlw def Pndant ahout tlu• incid(•nts it lllnst lw J'f'-
garded as prPjudieial. State 1·. Dicke1·.-.·011, snpra. l\1ore-
ov0r, the question reganlinp: a tltrPat to the ,-idim JllU(]P 
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some two years prior falls within the realm of "unproven 
accusation" which was calculated to degrade the defend-
ant in the eyes of the jury. 
POINT IV 
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT JUSTIFY THE JURY 
VERDICT OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER. 
'l'he Defendant respectfully submits that, under the 
cireumstances of the killing, the jury verdict is unsup-
portable by the evidence. The defendant contends that 
reasonable minds could not differ as to the facts leading 
up to tlit> fatal shot. 
'l,he facts, in a light most favorable to the jury verdict 
doe:-; not support the verdict of murder in the second 
dc'gn•P. The ddendant's testimony clearly shows that 
thP victim was making threats against his personal safety 
and well-being. Prior contacts with the victim lead to 
thti defendant having his teeth broken and injury to his 
ribs ( 1,R. 170). 'l,his was undisputed. On the day of the 
shooting, the victim made threats against the defendant 
\\'hi!(' standing nPar the chair wht>re the defendant was 
sr•at<~cl. Although, tlwre is some dispute as to when the 
\'idim wmt into the lwdroom for his gun, the defendant 
statPd that each went for his about the same time (TR. 
177), 'i,lw defendant got his gun from his care parked 
1JUtsidf• of th<' hons<'. I ft- fired one shot to "scare the 
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victim.'' \Vhen he re-<'ntered tlw house, the victim had 
his gun levelf'd at the defendant; whereupon the defend-
ant figured "it -was him or me." (TR.178). 'I1he de-
fendant fired, without taking aim. Further, the defendant 
did not observe the position of the hammer on the victim\: 
gun. 
In view of the situation which confronted the defend-
ant at the time of the firing, it cannot be said that what 
he did was not nec0so:ary to protect his own life. TlH• 
initial argt1rnPnts wPre provoked by the victim who \\'a' 
the larger of the two. It was the defendant's house. No 
more than onP shot was fired to rernoVf' the peril faeing-
the defrndant. 
llnder the standard set for by this court, the evidence 
does not justify the verdict of second degree murder. At 
the very least, voluntary manslaughter may be support-
able by the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the arguments raised, the appelllant re-
spectfully requests that th(~ conviction be reversed and 
the case rmnanded. In tlw alternative, the appellant 
submits that conviction for second deg-ree murder h<' 
vacated and that a lesser crime he found under the facts 
of the case. 
.. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
JIMI MITSUNAGA 
731 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attornpy for Defendant 
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